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DOES BOUNDED RATIONALITY LEAD TO INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY? 
THE IMPACT OF THE EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS  
AND OF MEMORY CONSTRAINTS 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
  Common assumptions in economics are that decision makers have unlimited time, information 
processing capabilities, and that they can be conceptualized as Bayesian maximizers. In this paper 
we restrict some of these assumptions within a genetic algorithm framework and focus the attention 
on individual convergence to equilibrium. We show that where identical and fully rational agents 
behave in a uniform manner, identical - but boundedly rational - agents can each behave differently.  
   In the context of a Cournot game, we tackle the issues of the impact of limited information 
processing capabilities on individual firms’ heterogeneity. The firms are modeled as adaptive 
economic agents with limited knowledge of the task and limited memory. They start with different 
strategies, which have been assigned to them randomly, they experiment with new strategies, and 
they learn from experience. In order to implement an evolutionary approach focused on the 
individual firm, we employ a genetic algorithm framework, where each agent is endowed with a 
separate set of strategies. This class of genetic algorithms is called multi-population or individual 
learning because the agents learn from their own experience, in contrast with the other class, known 
as single-population or social learning, where agents learn from other agents’ experiences (Dawid, 
1999; Holland and Miller, 1991; Vriend, 2000; Chen and Yeh, 2001). The social learning 
architecture has been successfully employed in the agent-based computational literature in 
economics to study aggregate behavior (Bullard and Duffy, 1998; Miller, 1996; Arifovic, 1996; 
Nowak and Sigmund, 1998) but we argue that the individual learning architecture is better suited 
for this study because it focuses on the individual behavior of the agents (Andrews and Prager, 
1994; Arifovic, 1994; Chen and Yeh, 1998).  
   Simulation results show that boundedly rational agents exhibit a remarkable heterogeneity in 
behavior. Contrary to what one might expect, this result is not simply a consequence of the random 
elements contained in the genetic algorithm. For instance, consider agents that randomly draw the 
strategy they play from a uniform distribution  every period. We show that the resulting individual 
heterogeneity of such agents that play completely at random is lower than from the interaction of 
genetic algorithm agents. Moreover, with a rise in the memory capabilities and the ability to explore 
unavailable strategies, individual differences decline and the results suggest that, in the limit case of 
full rationality, we obtain the standard result of uniform individual behavior. 
   The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the Cournot model and the parameter 
values used in the simulations. Then, the procedures followed by agents in making decisions are 
explained in Section 3, where we illustrate the design of the genetic algorithm and state some of its 
properties. The main result about individual heterogeneity is in Section 4, along with the discussion 
about whether it is simply due to excessive noise. Our findings suggest that it is not.  Moreover, the 
higher the rationality level of the decision-makers, the lower the level of individual heterogeneity. 
Changes in rationality levels are generated by adjusting pre-play evaluation of new strategies 
through a weaker and a stronger filter (trembling hand and election, in Section 5) and by varying 
working memory size (Section 6). Conclusions are in Section 7. 
 
2   THE COURNOT EXAMPLE 
   The playground for the boundedly rational agents is a standard Cournot oligopoly game, Γ(N, 
(Si)i∈N, (πi)i∈N). In the game, there are N identical firms who all compete in the same market and 
produce the same homogeneous commodity. The decision variable for firm i is the quantity xi to be 
produced, which lies in [0, ϑ]. All firms simultaneously choose a production level, and then a 
market price p is determined through the clearing of market demand and supply. Let us assume that 
the inverse demand function is p(X)=d-bX, where X= ∑
=
N
i
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1
 and d, b>0; and the cost function is 
c(xi)=α xi, which is linear and identical for all firms. Hence the profit function is  
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has a continuous strategy space and a unique, symmetric, and evolutionary stable Nash equilibrium. 
In other words, this game provides ideal conditions to facilitate convergence toward the Nash 
equilibrium outcome both at the aggregate and individual levels. The parameter values adopted are 
N= 8, ϑ=50, α = 5/2, d = 23/2, b=1/16, which yields Nash equilibrium values of X*=128, xi*=16 
∀i, and p*=7.5.
2 At the Nash equilibrium, industry profits are less than monopoly profits; in 
particular, earnings  are 39.5% of monopoly profits. As will be explained in the next Section, the 
precise numerical values of the parameters are not crucial for these analyses. More precisely, any 
positive monotonic transformation of the payoff function will not alter the results in this paper 
(Proposition 2). The Cobweb model is a very common playground in the computational economics 
literature and different specifications for price expectations have been put forward (Hommes, 1998; 
Jensen and Urban, 1984; Arifovic, 1994). In his seminal work, Ezekiel (1938) employs naïve 
expectations where current price expectations are simply the last period price,  1
e
tt pp − = . In the 
Cournot setting adopted here, price expectations for the current period are equal to the price in the 
last period adjusted by variations due to changes in the quantity that the firm itself is going to 
produce,  () 1, , 1
e
tt i t i t ppb xx −− =− − . 
 
3   DESCRIPTION OF THE GENETIC ALGORITHM AGENTS 
  Genetic algorithm agents will play the Cournot game described in the previous Section. A full 
description of the working of a genetic algorithm (GA) is given in the textbooks of Holland (1975), 
Goldberg(1989), and Mitchell (1996). For issues specific to Economics see the excellent study of 
Dawid (1996). This section introduces the GA decision makers along with the parameter values 
                                                 
2 Notice that the Nash Equilibrium outcome is not positioned in the center of the action space (i.e. at 200) so that it 
would not be reached through pure chance by zero intelligence agents.  
used in the simulations. In order to analyze individual behavior, the simulations employ an 
individual learning (multi-population) genetic algorithm. Three interesting aspects of this 
framework are discussed in more detail: the memory set, the choice rule, and the ordinal nature of 
the GA. 
   The genetic algorithm decision maker can be described as follow. The strategy which agents have 
to choose is identified by a single real number. It is encoded as a binary string, a so-called 
chromosome, and has associated with it a score (measure of fitness) that derives from the actual or 
potential payoff from this strategy. In a social learning (single-population) basic GA, each agent has 
just one strategy (chromosome) available, which may change from one period to the next. The 
changes are governed by three probabilistic operators: a reinforcement rule (selection), which tends 
to eliminate strategies with lower score and replicate more copies of the better performing ones; 
crossover, which combines new strategies from the existing ones; and mutation, which may 
randomly modify strategies.
3 In a basic GA, the strategies (chromosomes) created by crossover and 
mutation are directly included in the next period’s set of strategies (population). 
   The three operators are stylized devices that are meant to capture the following elements involved 
in human learning when agents interact. The reinforcement rule (selection) represents evolutionary 
pressure that induces agents to discard bad strategies and imitate good strategies; crossover 
represent the creation of new strategies and the exchange of information; mutation can bring new 
strategies into a range that has not been considered by the agents. 
   Simulations are run with an individual learning GA (Figure 1), which is discussed in the 
remainder of this section. When agents do not consider just one strategy at each period in time, but 
have a finite collection of strategies from which one is chosen in every period (memory set), the 
process is called a multi-population GA. A strategy is a real number aikt∈[0,50] that represent the 
production level of firm i in period t. Each agent is endowed with an individual memory set 
Ait={ai1t ,…, aiKt} composed of a number of strategies K that is constant over time and exogenously 
                                                 
3 The crossover operator first, randomly selects two strategies out of a population; second, selects at random an integer 
number w from [1, L-1]. Two new strategies are formed by swapping the portion of the binary string to the right of the 
position w.   
given. If a strategy aikt is in the memory set, i.e. it is available, agent i can choose it for play at time 
t. When there exist more than K strategies in the game, there are always strategies that are not 
currently available in the memory set. Notice that an available strategy has no impact on the 
outcome unless it is chosen for play. 
  The size of the memory set, K, is a measure of the level of sophistication of an agent since it 
determines how many strategies an agent can simultaneously evaluate and remember. The 
Psychology literature has pointed out that the working memory has severe limitations in the 
quantity of information that it can store and process. According to these findings, the memory 
limitation is not just imperfect recall from one round to the next, but rather an inability to maintain 
an unlimited amount of information in memory during cognitive processing (Miller, 1956; Daily et 
al., 2001). By setting K=6 we assume that decision-makers have a hardwired limitation in 
processing information at 6 strategies at a time. The classic article by Miller(1956) stresses the 
“magic number seven” as the typical number of units in people’s working memory.
4 
   As each agent is endowed with a memory set, in the multi-population GA there is an additional 
issue of how to choose a strategy to play out of the K available. The choice rule, C: A(K) → A, is a 
stochastic operator that works as a one-time pairwise tournament, where (1) two strategies, aikt and 
aiqt, are randomly drawn with replacement from the memory set Ait and (2) the strategy with the 
highest score in the pair is chosen to be played: a*it=argmax{s(aikt), s(aiqt)}.  A pairwise tournament 
is different from deterministic maximization, because the best strategy in the memory set is picked 
with a probability less than one.
5 The choice rule, however, is characterized by a probabilistic 
response that favors high-score over low-score available strategies. In particular, the probability of 
choosing a strategy is strictly increasing in its ranking within the memory set (Proposition 1). The 
                                                 
4 The memory set size K needs to be even, so it could have been set to 8. There is debate in the psycological literature 
about what constitutes an unit when counting to 7. In this specific application it seems reasonable to identify a single 
strategy as a unit. 
5 In general, an M-tournament choice rule is weaker than a deterministic maximization (“choose the available strategy 
with the highest score”) in two ways.  First, the number of available strategies involved in the tournament is generally 
lower that the size of the memory set, M<K, and so only a subset of available strategies is actually compared (with a 
pairwise tournament, M=2).  Second, even when M=K, the choice rule is different from deterministic maximization 
because the M available strategies are drawn with replacement. More precisely, there is a [(K-1)/K]
K chance of 
choosing a strategy different from the best one in the set.  
stochastic element in the choice captures the imperfect ability to find an optimum, where the 
probability of a mistake is related to its cost. 
   Proposition 1: The probability that an available strategy x is chosen for play, x*=x, by a pairwise 
tournament choice rule out of a set A of K available strategies is  {}
2
1 2
*
K
r
x x P
x −
= = , where rx is the 
ranking of the available strategy x within the set A (the worst available strategy ranks 1, rx=1, and 
there is an assumption that there are no ties). ♦ Proofs to propositions are in the Appendix. 
   The most common choice rules in the literature are pairwise tournament and biased roulette 
wheel. We have adopted a pairwise tournament because it is ordinal, in the sense that the 
probabilities are based only on “greater than” comparisons among strategies. While in a biased 
roulette wheel the score needs to be positive and its absolute magnitude is important to compute the 
probability of being replicated, none of these matter for an ordinal operator like pairwise 
tournament.  An ordinal operator does not rely on a “biological” interpretation of the score as a 
perfect measure of the relative advantage of one strategy over another (Proposition 2). 
    Proposition 2: The results of the GA agent interactions  are unaffected  by any strictly increasing 
transformation v:R→R of the score function. ♦ 
   The score is the index of performance for a strategy aikt and is a function of the monetary payoff 
π, s(aikt)= v[π(aikt, a -it)]. The score of a strategy can be interpreted as the utility of the outcome 
associated with that strategy. Given the ordinality of pairwise tournaments adopted for 
reinforcement and choice rule, this GA is based only on the ordinal information of the score, like 
the utility function of the consumer. As a consequence, the simulation results are robust to any 
strictly increasing payoff transformation v. 
    A score is assigned to every strategy in the memory set, whether the strategy was chosen to be 
played or not. The distinction between the two cases is conceptually rather important. Assigning a 
score to a strategy that was actually employed (actual score) is an instance of reinforcement 
learning. Assigning a score to all the other available strategies, which were not actually used 
(potential score), always relies on a model, however subjective and imperfect, of the behavior of the  
other agents (Kreps, 1998). As already explained in Section 2, the model assumes that the price 
expectation in the current period is equal to the price in the last period adjusted by variations due to 
changes in the quantity that the firm itself is going to produce:  () 1, , 1
e
tt i t i t ppb xx −− =− − .
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4   INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY 
   Before proceeding to outline the simulation results, an example is presented to introduce the 
precise definition of individual heterogeneity adopted throughout the paper. After stating the main 
conclusion (Result 1), some benchmark cases are provided to show that noise, which is built into a 
GA, is not responsible for the claim of individual heterogeneity across agents (Result 2). 
   The same level of aggregate variability can hide widely different patterns of individual variability. 
The following example illustrates which is the individual dimension that matters for our analyses. 
Consider scenarios A and B in Table 2 with two players and four periods. 
   The two scenarios are identical when considering both aggregate production Xt=Σi xit and overall 
indexes of variability of individual actions, such as the mean of the difference, period by period, 
between the maximum and minimum individual productions, D1= {} {}
1
1
max min
T
it it i i
t
xx
T =
− ∑ , or the 
standard deviation of individual actions xit (SD1). The differences in the patterns of individual 
variability between scenario A and B can be captured by splitting the overall individual variability 
into variability across agents (D2 and SD2) and over time (SD3). In order to calculate agent-specific 
variability, first we compute the average individual production over time
1
1
T
ii t
t
xx
T =
= ∑  and, using  
those data, compute the difference D2= {} {} max min ii
i i xx −  and the standard deviation for  i x  (SD2) 
                                                 
6    From the previous discussion it is apparent that the knowledge and computational abilities assumed for a GA agent 
are very limited. An agent should be able to (1) count from 1 to K, (2) flip coins, (3) make ordinal comparisons between 
two real numbers, (4) evaluate the score of an outcome, and (5) remember K strategies. The toughest requirement 
comes for the assignment of the potential score, where an agent needs also (6) to understand how the outcome of the 
last period changes when he adopts a different strategy while everybody else does not. Agent i must know his payoff 
function, πi, and others' aggregate actions from the previous period, a-it. He does not need to know the payoff function 
of other agents, πj with j≠i, their individual past strategies, a*jt,  whether they are fully or boundedly rational players, 
nor how many agents N there are.  
(Table 2). Scenario A rates highly in terms of variability across agents, and that is referred to here 
as high individual heterogeneity, while scenario B rates highly in terms of variability over time but 
exhibits no individual heterogeneity.  
When the same statistics developed for the example in Table 2 are applied to the simulation results 
(Table 3),  a remarkable level of  heterogeneity emerges from the interaction of ex-ante identical 
genetic algorithm agents (Result 1). 
Simulation result 1 (Individual heterogeneity) 
In a game with a unique Nash equilibrium, boundedly rational agents (multi-population genetic 
algorithms) with identical preferences and identical rationality levels generate individual behavior 
that is heterogeneous across agents. ♦ 
   The interaction of GA agents generates a difference between minimum and maximum of 
D2=11.08, which constitutes 69% of the individual symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome of xi*=16 
and 22% of the range [0,50] of the individual strategy space. The standard deviations of individual 
production averages is SD2=3.68 (column (2) in Table 3). All of the results in Table 3 are averages 
over 100 runs with different random seeds. A single run consists of 400 iterations among the agents 
and the results reported are relative to the last 100 iterations (from 301 to 400). 
   Although bounded, the agents are endowed with identical levels of rationality. Yet they generate 
individually distinct behavior. Had they been designed with differentiated goals or variable skills, 
the heterogeneity of behavior would have not been surprising. When in experimental data identical 
incentives are given and heterogeneous behavior is observed (Ledyard, 1995, p.170-173; Casari and 
Plott, forthcoming), the explanation generally put forward is an individual-specific utility function. 
   The only built-in diversity in the genetic algorithm agents is the random initialization of the 
strategies. In other words, agents do not have common priors. Besides random initialization, there 
are four other stochastic operators (reinforcement rule, choice rule, crossover, mutation) that might 
introduce variability in the data. In order to have a benchmark to evalutate the influence of  
randomness and the magnitude of individual heterogeneity,  the GA outcome can be compared with 
the result of interactions among zero intelligence agents ((2) vs. (8) in Table 3).  
   Zero intelligence agents are designed in the spirit of Gode and Sunder (1993) and are essentially 
pure noise,
7 as the individual strategy for each firm is drawn from a uniform distribution on the 
strategy space [0,50] and then aggregated to compute market production and price. Individual 
heterogeneity of zero intelligence agents is remarkably lower than in the case of genetic algorithm 
agents. While scoring much higher in terms of overall variability (D1ZI=39.09 vs. D1GA=15.06), 
zero-intelligence agents are characterized by half as much individual heterogeneity as genetic 
algorithm agents (D2ZI=4.17 vs. D2GA=11.08, SD2ZI=1.41 vs. SD2GA=3.68). In other words, Result 
1 is not a consequence of the noise built into the GA. 
   In interpreting the results, it might be helpful to illustrate individual heterogeneity in outcomes 
with the following example. Suppose that every day you parachute a person from an airplane into 
the same unfamiliar region with the goal of reaching a specific point by foot. You give to the person 
a detailed area map. If all agents can read a map and have good orienteering skills, they will 
converge to the agreed upon spot at the end of the day. Now, suppose that you don’t give the map 
but just show it before take off. Even under the restrictive assumptions that everybody can 
remember the same quantity of information from the map, one might wonder whether everybody 
will be at the same spot at the end of the day. It may depend on the specific features that each of 
them have memorized and on the way in which they assess the success of a new path. 
   Among the stochastic operators of a GA, consider the innovation process, and in particular the 
mutation rate, which is the prime source of noise. The composition of the memory set changes, 
among other reasons, because of active, random experimentation.  In this study the strategy space is 
divided into a grid and strategies expressed in real numbers in the decimal system are translated into 
equivalent binary strings of 0s and 1s. This paper follows the uniform binary mutation process at 
the rate pm, which is common in the GA literature.  Under this innovation process, there is a 
                                                 
7 In Gode and Sunder(1993) they are subject to a budget constraint as well.  
probability pm∈(0,1) that each digit ‘0’ flips to ‘1’ or vice versa, with  pm held constant for all the 
digits irrespective of their high or low cardinality of the string.  Hence, the transitions from 111 to 
101 and from 111 to 011 happen with the same probability.  
   Given a mutation rate pm, for ease of interpretation we can translate it into an innovation level p – 
which measures the expected percentage of strategies that will change because of the innovation 
process (mutation) – using the formula p=1-(1-pm)
L, where L is the number of digits of the binary 
string. A value of pm=0.02 such as the one adopted in the baseline GA corresponds to an expected 
number of new strategies  due to innovation of 14.92% of the total in the memory set.
8 
   A comparative static analysis is performed to evaluate the impact of a different innovation level. 
Two cases of special interest are when the innovation level moves toward zero and when it moves 
toward one. 
   Before presenting the impact of the innovation rate on individual heterogeneity, a clarification is 
necessary regarding the reinforcement operator (selection). The level of variability in the outcome is 
the result of two opposite tendencies at work within the genetic algorithm. One is the generation of 
new strategies because of  the innovation operator and the other is the elimination of bad strategies 
due to the reinforcement operator. Hence, an excessive variability might be due more to a high 
innovation rate than to a weak reinforcement operator. As it will be explained, in this GA design the 
opposite is true because a pairwise tournament implements a stronger selection than a biased 
roulette wheel. 
   The reinforcement rule (selection) is a pairwise tournament repeated K times, R: A(K) → A(K), 
which is applied separately to each agent’s memory set: (1) at time t two strategies, aikt and aiqt, are 
randomly drawn with replacement from the memory set Ait and (2) the strategy with the highest 
score in the pair is placed in the new set: ai•t+1=argmax{s(aikt), s(aiqt)}; (3) the previous two 
                                                 
8 The innovation rates used in four  other studies are the following:  Arifovic (1996) uses L=30 and pm=0.0033 or 
pm=0.033, which translates into p=0.0944 or p=0.6346; Andreoni and Miller (1995) L=10, pm=0.08 with exponential 
decay and half-life of 250 generations: p=0.5656 for t=1 and 0.0489 for t=1000; Bullard and Duffy (1998), L=21, 
pm=0.048: p=0.6441; Nowak and Sigmund (1998), p=0.001.  
operations are performed K times in order to generate a complete memory set for agent i at time 
t+1, Ai,t+1. 
   Agents are adaptive learners in the sense that successful strategies are reinforced. Strategies that 
perform well – or that would have performed well if employed – over time gradually replace poor-
performing ones. With experience, the composition of the memory set becomes the distilled 
wisdom of past decisions and past outcomes. 
A key characteristic of a reinforcement rule is how quickly a successful strategy displaces the others 
in the memory set.  One measure of this is the expected takeover time (TOT), which indicates how 
many iterations of the reinforcement rule it takes (in expectation) for a new strategy that has the 
highest score in the set to replace all other strategies in the set (Bäck, 1996).  At the end of the 
process, when no other new strategy is introduced, all strategies are copies of the successful new 
one.
9 The takeover time of the pairwise tournament rule is TOT=(ln K + ln(ln K))/ ln 2, which 
equals 3.43 iterations for a memory set of size 6 (Bäck, 1996).  
   According to Bäck(1996), the expected takeover time with biased roulette wheel reinforcement 
when the score function is exponential, f(x)=exp(cx), is approximately (1/c) K ln K, which is of 
order o(K ln K). Given that pairwise tournament TOT is of order o(ln K), for large memory sizes 
tournament rules discard bad strategies faster than biased roulette wheel rules.
10-11 
   After this clarification, let us turn to the effect of the innovation rate on the individual 
heterogeneity stated in Result 1. The results of varying p from 0.025 to 0.992  (pm=0.005-0.45) on 
the variability indexes D1, D2, SD2, SD3, X, SD(X) are shown in Figure 2 The data shows four 
                                                 
9 A shorter takeover time is not necessarily better, though, because keeping the knowledge of old available strategies 
can be useful when the “environment” changes. Suppose for instance that there is an exogenous 6-period-long cycle in 
the environment and that there are only two possible strategies: x, best for the first 3 periods, and y, best for the last 3 
periods. If TOT=2 the agent will lose memory of one strategy and needs to learn it all over again by experimentation at 
every cycle. An agent with TOT=4 will perform better. 
10 The same inequality holds for small numbers under mild conditions. For instance, for every K>2 when c<2. 
11 Two additional comments on the comparison between reinforcement rules in a genetic algorithm and in a replicator 
dynamic: first, in evolutionary game theory the replicator dynamic works in a context similar to the single-population 
genetic algorithm environment (social learning), while here the architecture is of multi-population GA (individual 
learning). In our design, there is no imitation of strategy from one agent to another (i.e., across different sets).  Second, 
replicator dynamics generally work in continuous time while a genetic algorithm works in discrete time. It is shown in 
Weibull (1995) that in discrete time strictly dominated strategies need not to get wiped out as they are in continuous 
time.  
major results. First, GA agents are no less individually heterogeneous  than zero-intelligence agent 
for all innovation rates. Second, as the innovation rate approaches zero, individual heterogeneity 
does not disappear, on the contrary, it is at its highest peak ((3) in Table 3). Third, as the innovation 
rate grows, individual heterogeneity declines toward the level of zero-intelligence agents and, at the 
same time, variability over time steadily grows. Fourth, for higher levels of noise, especially beyond 
p=0.30, the aggregate outcomes moves away from the aggregate Nash equilibrium outcome. These 
considerations leads us to state Result 2. 
Simulation result 2 (Heterogeneity and randomness)The high level of innovation of the agents is 
not responsible for the individual heterogeneity result. ♦ 
 
 
5   EFFECTS OF THE ELECTION OPERATOR 
 
   Identical bounded rationality agents produce individually heterogenous outcomes (Result 1). Does 
this result depend on the modality of evaluation of new strategies? Or on the memory constraints? 
This section and the next one look at what aspects of bounded rationality are responsible for the 
main result by exploring two dimensions of the rationality of GA agents, the process of pre-play 
evaluation of new strategies and working memory constraints. We begin with the former dimension. 
   A GA agent is characterized not only by its level of innovation but also by the filters that exist 
between the creation of a new strategy and the decision to choose it for play. In the baseline agent 
design, all new strategies are assigned a potential score before one strategy is chosen from the 
memory set (Fresh score).
12 Two other new strategy evaluation designs are now discussed: a weaker 
filter (trembling hand) and a stronger filter (election operator). 
   In the trembling hand design a new strategy keeps the score of its parent strategy. The “parent” 
strategy is the original strategy before the mutation happened or, in case of crossover, the strategy 
that has determined the highest bits in the binary string of the new one. The behavioral 
interpretation of trembling hand is of an agent that does not realize that a new strategy is different 
                                                 
12 The score is only potential because the new strategy was not used for play (see discussion in Section 2).  
from the parent strategy until the following periods. As a consequence he could play it, with the 
intention of playing the parent strategy and assigning to it a new score afterwards. 
  The election operator screens each new strategy before it is permitted to become an available 
strategy for play. This operator has become more and more common in social science applications 
(Arifovic, 1994;  Bullard and Duffy, 1998). The new strategy replaces its parent strategy in the 
memory set only if its potential score improves its parent’s (potential or real) score. If the score of 
the new strategy is lower than its parent strategy’s score, the parent strategy remains in the memory 
set. This version of the election operator is weaker than that of Arifovic (1994) and similar to 
Franke (1997). 
   One could think of the three designs as implementing three sequential levels of reasoning. A 
trembling hand agent does not filter new strategies before putting them into practice. A Fresh score 
agent is a more thoughtful type and assigns a potential score to new strategies based on what would 
have been the outcome in the last period, so as to assess its potential performance this period. In 
addition to this evaluation, an agent endowed with the election operator compares the performance 
of old and new strategies to avoid discarding old strategies that are better than the new one.  
      In a social learning environment, there is no difference between the trembling hand and Fresh 
score design, because the effect of the Fresh score works through the choice rule (Figure 1. To 
understand the functioning of the Fresh score design in an individual learning GA, assume that there 
is no crossover but just mutation. Then in expectation, there are pK new strategies available in the 
memory set of each agent each period. What is the probability that a new strategy is actually 
played? In general, the probability is less than p (Propositions 3 and 4, below). Consider a situation 
with a continuous payoff function when all the strategies in the memory set are in a neighborhood 
of the equilibrium. A random new strategy is likely to rank lower here than in the memory set at 
period zero, which is randomly generated. In other words, the actual innovation rate, i.e. in terms of 
new strategies played, is going to change over time and become smaller when the GA agent is near 
equilibrium.  
Proposition 3: Let X be the memory set, X=XA∪XB, and XA be the subset of old strategies and XB 
be the subset of new strategies currently introduced by the innovation process..  If all available 
strategies have the same score, the probability that the chosen strategy x* is a new strategy, 
P{x*∈XB},  
a) is equivalent to the innovation level, p= P{x*∈XB} 
b) is independentof the size of the memory set ♦ 
Proposition 4: If the sum of rankings of new available strategies within a memory set,  ∑
∈ B X x
x r , 
declines, the probability that a new available strategy becomes the action, P{x*∈XB}, declines as 
well. ♦ 
Simulation result 3 (Election operator) 
When the agents are endowed with an election operator, the individual heterogeneity level is lower 
than the level inthe basic GA agents’ simulation only when the level of innovation is higher than 
44%.♦ 
The results of the simulations under the trembling hand and election operator design are shown in 
columns (4) and (5), respectively, of Table 3. Not surprisingly, the trembling hand agents are more 
noisy at the aggregate and overall individual level than the Fresh score agents (SD(X)TH=14.84 vs. 
SD(X)FS=9.89 and D1TH=18.80 vs. D1FS=15.06). Trembling hand individuals are also slightly less 
heterogeneous (D2TH=10.47 vs. D2FS=11.08), due to a similar effect of the higher amount of noise 
in the Fresh score design, as explained in the discussion of Figure 2 Although it produces aggregate 
results closer to the Nash equilibrium outcome and with a dramatically reduced variance 
(SD(X)EL=0.11 vs. SD(X)FS=9.89), the election operator – surprisingly –  does not decrease the 
amount of individual heterogeneity compared to the Fresh score design (D2EL=11.91 vs. 
D2FS=11.08). The surprise comes from the general view that the election operator characterizes 
agents with a higher level of rationality.  
   The election operator has a dramatic impact on the behavior of GA agents but does not lower 
individual heterogeneity. At the aggregate level, the result is similar to the work of Arifovic (1994) 
for the cobweb model. Without the election operator, there is a higher variability in the market’s 
production (Figure 2B, which almost completely disappears with the election operator (Figure 3B). 
Yet, some other results are counterintuitive, as one would conjecture that a higher level of 
rationality, as the election operator is generally intended to induce, would lead to behavior that is 
closer to the symmetric Nash equilibrium at the individual level. To better investigate the 
functioning of the election operator, simulations were run varying the innovation rate as has been 
done with the baseline Fresh score GA design (Figure 2). The effect of the election operator on 
individual heterogeneity is not the same for all innovation rates. In comparison with the Fresh score 
design, a higher individual heterogeneity, according to both D2 and SD2 indexes, is detected for 
innovation rates between p=0.11 (pm=0.015) and p=0.44 (pm=0.070). For innovation rates above 
p=0.44, individual heterogeneity quickly declines below the level of the zero-intelligence agent 
(p=0.57, pm=0.1) and then toward zero; moreover, both individual heterogeneity and aggregate 
outcomes are closer to Nash equilibrium. Beyond p=0.81 (pm=0.185), the election operator seem to 
lose control of the inflow of new strategies from the high innovation rate, and the variance of 
aggregate outcome has a spike. 
   The innovation process is the counterbalance to the tendency to reinforce good strategies over 
time. In the Fresh score design, if the rate of innovation is too high there is a danger of corrupting 
the hard-learnt good strategies. With the election operator there is no such danger: when a new 
strategy does not promise to be better than its parent it does not get a chance of being played. As a 
matter of fact, it is immediately forgotten. In this context, the innovation rate needs a different 
interpretation than in the Fresh score design. One might think of it as an index of computational 
speed, i.e. of how many strategies the agent can create, evaluate, and compare in one period. The 
election operator with a high innovation rate induces a superior ability to explore currently 
unavailable options.  
   In a social learning GA all new strategies are automatically played and the election operator is the 
only way to filter out disruptive behavior (Figure 1). In an individual learning GA, instead, there is 
an additional filter between innovation and play, which is the choice rule. A new strategy with a 
low potential score has a low chance of being selected for play (Proposition 1) but will be kept in 
memory for future periods. 
 
6   EFFECTS OF MEMORY CONSTRAINTS 
Stronger memory capabilities make for a smarter decision maker. An agent with a larger memory 
size K has a longer historical memory (TOT) and abandons an available strategy only after a longer 
sequence of trials. Moreover, the decision maker has some advantages (either an advantage or some 
advantages) in the ability to choose a better strategy (Corollary 1). 
Corollary 1: (i) The median ranking available strategy is chosen with probability 1/K. 
(ii)  The odds that the best versus the worst available strategy is chosen are increasing in the 
memory set size, (2K-1) (inverse of error odds). 
(iii)  Consider K even.  The probability that the chosen strategy ranks above the median ranking 
available strategy is ¾, irrespective of the size of the memory set. ♦ 
While keeping the innovation level at p=0.15 (pm=0.02), we can study the effect of different 
memory sizes, letting K range from 2 to 100 (Figure 3). While augmenting noise (p) fades 
individual heterogeneity by generating overall variability (SD(X)), relaxing memory constraints 
makes for a better decision-maker with both lower individual heterogeneity (D2, SD2) and lower 
variance over time of individual actions (SD3). Numerical values for K=2 and K=90 can be found 
in columns (6) and (7) of Table 3. This result is also in line with the findings of the psychological 
literature: “differences in working memory capacity predict performance on a variety of tasks” 
(Daily et al., 2001). 
   A larger memory set systematically reduces individual heterogeneity. Initially the reduction in 
individual heterogeneity is fast and then it slows without stopping its decline. For K≥50 the genetic  
algorithm agents are always less individually heterogeneous than zero-intelligence agents and with 
a memory set as large as K=100 the individual heterogeneity is almost half that (D2=2.38 and 
SD2=0.80).
13 In conclusion, memory size matters (Result 4).  
Simulation result 4 (Memory constraints) 
When the rationality level of the agents is enhanced by enlarging memory capabilities, the 
individual heterogeneity level decreases toward zero. ♦ 
 
7   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
   In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual 
behavior to a given equilibrium. We show that constraints in terms of information processing 
capabilities and working memory can lead, in a game with a symmetric Nash equilibrium, to 
individually heterogeneous behavior. Moreover, as the rationality level increases, agents converge 
to uniform behavior. 
    Several experimental studies in economics report that under identical incentives people behave in 
a different fashion (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; Saijo and Nakamura, 1995; Ledyard, 1995; Casari 
and Plott, forthcoming). One way to rationalize this evidence is to assume individual-specific utility 
functions. Alternatively, agents can have identical goals but differentiated skills. This study offers a 
third explanation: agents with identical goals and identical, although limited, levels of rationality. 
   Individual behavior is studied in the context of a Cournot game. In this game, fully rational agents 
should choose identical strategies. This paper presents simulated interactions of identical agents at 
several different levels of bounded rationality. The tool employed for agent-based modeling is an 
individual learning genetic algorithm (Holland and Miller, 1991; Vriend, 1998; Chen and Yeh, 
2001). While allowing each agents to evolve based on its own experience, an individual learning 
genetic algorithm can be designed to fit many levels of agent rationality. Four analytical results 
regarding properties of genetic algorithm are presented in order to link the choice of the algorithm 
                                                 
13 Consider that there are 256 possible strategy in the bynary coding.  
design to behavioral assumptions (Propositions 1-4). In particular, the propositions concern the 
experimentation process, the effect of memory constraints, and invariance to payoff 
transformations. 
   In the baseline simulation, each agent can remember and process six strategies at a time, a number 
close to what is suggested about the working memory in the Psychology literature (Miller, 1956; 
Daily et al., 2001). Over time the best strategies gain a higher probability of being played. For each 
agent, new strategies are randomly generated (crossover and innovation) and introduced into her set 
of available strategies.  
   The simulations lead to four main results regarding the effect of bounded rationality on individual 
behavior. First, with limited information processing abilities and constrained working memory, 
individual actions are remarkably heterogeneous (Result 1). Second, even though one might suspect 
that the outcome is the result of the stochastic nature of some genetic algorithm operators (and 
hence it is built-in by construction), we show that this is not the case. Evidence from simulations 
indicates that genetic algorithm agents exhibit more individual heterogeneity than zero-intelligence 
agents (Gode and Sunder, 1993), who are essentially pure noise. In addition, lowering the 
innovation rate does not lead to homogeneous behavior. In other words, the heterogeneity result 
holds up besides the added noise (Result 2). 
   The other two results support the interpretation that individual heterogeneity is caused by bounded 
rationality. They indicate that as the level of agent rationality increases, individual heterogeneity 
fades away, yielding the standard prediction that fully rational agents have uniform behavior. 
Within the class of individual learning genetic algorithms, two dimensions of the bounds on 
rationality are explored: the innovation process and memory constraints. Relaxing memory 
constraints lowers individual heterogeneity, and the data suggest that it goes to zero for infinite 
memory capabilities (Result 4). This outcome of the computation model is in line with finding of 
the Psychology literature (Daily et al., 2001). In a separate set of simulations, the baseline model is 
adjusted by adding a more sophisticated evaluation of pre-play strategies in the form of an election  
operator. The individual heterogeneity does not disappear unless a high innovation rate is set 
(Result 3). In this context, innovation is interpreted as an index of computational speed of the agent. 
   To summarize, the contributions of this paper go into two directions: individual convergence to 
equilibrium and genetic algorithm design. First, it reports the existence of an inverse correlation 
between levels of rationality and levels of individual heterogeneity. In the limit, the simulations 
suggest that uniform behavior would  result from full rationality. Second, it sheds light on the 
design of multi-population genetic algorithms. In particular, we explore the interaction of the 
election operator with the innovation rate and the working of the memory set in conjunction with a 
choice rule. 
   Interestingly, the simulation results also suggest that the Nash equilibrium is a more robust 
predictor of aggregate behavior than of individual behavior.  It is as if a maximum range of 
individual diversity is compatible within a bound of agent capabilities. When there is a wide space 
of unexploited opportunities, even agents with heavy cognitive limits can find them and reap the 
gains but when the space is narrow they are not capable of doing so. As the search abilities rise 
along with rationality levels, the opportunities for gains disappear. For instance, if a firm grossly 
under-produces in a Cournot setting, there is an opportunity for another firm to “overproduce” and, 
as a result, market production could still be rather close to the aggregate Nash equilibrium outcome.  
However, more work is needed in this regard. 
   Other changes in the rationality level of the decision maker could be explored, such as the effect 
of a different rule to choose a strategy out of each of the individual sets of available strategies as 
well as an innovation process different from uniform binary mutation. They are all legitimate, and 
not mutually exclusive, possibilities to model the agents. This work is not a statement that any form 
of bounded rationality will lead to individual heterogeneity in behavior. In fact, in the context that 
we have analyzed only heavy bounds to rationality have produced it. The open issue is then how to 
calibrate these models to the actual cognitive limitations of people in order to understand if and how 
much of the individual heterogeneity observed in experimental data is due to bounded rationality.  
APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the ranking of available strategies x in A, {1,2, …, rx, …, K} and a choice rule which 
operates by (1) drawing with replacement two available strategies out of A, and (2) taking the one with the highest score 
between the two. Let px= pa· pb=P{x is drawn out of A}·P{x is chosen after it has been drawn}. There are three possible 
cases in which the available strategy x can be drawn, so the total probability is  pa=P{(x,y)}+ P{(y,x)}+ 
P{(x,x)}=
K K K K
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K
K
K
1 1 1 1 1 1
⋅ + ⋅
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⋅ , where y≠x. When the competing available strategy is y, the probability 
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K
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The expression above defines a probability distribution since  ∑∑
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Proof of Corollary 1: (i) The median ranking is defined as ry=(K+1)/2, hence py=1/K. (ii) P{rx=1}=1/K
2, P{rz=K}=(2K-
1)/K
2, odds=pz/px=(2K-1). (iii) Suppose K is an even number,  3
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Proof of Proposition 2: When the score s(aik) is replaced by v(s(aik)), where v is a real function such that ∂v/∂·>0, the 
results of the decision process are not changed by the operations performed through the reinforcement rule, the 
innovation process, and the choice rule. The innovation process does not depend at all on the score.  Both reinforcement 
and choice rules are based on a pairwise tournament, which operates on the ranking of the available strategies.  As v 
does not change rankings, the results are unchanged. ♦ 
Proof of Proposition 3: Given an innovation level p (probability that an old available strategy is replaced by a new one), 
the expected number of new available strategies in a memory set of size K is E[|XB|]=pK.  When all available strategies 
have the same score, the probability that one of those new available strategies becomes an action is P{x*∈XB}=(1/K) 
E[|XB|]=p. ♦ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the probability of an available strategy from the set XB becoming an action, 
P{x*∈XB}= () ∑
∈
− =
−
B X x
B
x pK R
K K
r
2
1 1 2
2 2
, where RB= ∑
∈ B X x
x r , and |XB|=pK.               
The proposition follows from ∂ P{x*∈XB}/∂RB>0. ♦ 
    When new strategies are freshly evaluated, the expected number of new strategies that will be chosen is likely to 
decline as agents approach equilibrium.  The actual ranking of a new available strategy aikt depends on how much 
learning has already taken place and on the nature of the innovation process itself. 
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Figure 1: INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL LEARNING GENETIC ALGORITHMS 
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Figure 2: HETEROGENEITY AND INNOVATION RATE (FRESH SCORE) 
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Notes: GA v.7.5, see Table 1; innovation rate p=1-(1-pm)
L, pm=mutation rate,  
L=string length; pm from 0.005 to 0.450; average of periods from 301 to 400 of 100 runs.
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Figure 3: HETEROGENEITY AND INNOVATION RATE (ELECTION OPERATOR) 
 
A: Differences between maximum and minimum individual actions 
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B: Market behavior 
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Notes: GA v.7.7 (Election), see Table 1; innovation rate p=1-(1-pm)
L,  
pm=mutation rate, L=string length; pm from 0.005 to 0.450; 
average of periods from 301 to 400 of 100 runs. 
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Figure 4: HETEROGENEITY AND MEMORY CONSTRAINTS 
 
A: Differences between maximum and minimum individual actions 
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B: Market behavior 
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Notes: GA v.7.5 (Fresh score), see Table 1; K from 2 to 100 at interval 
of 2; average of periods from 301 to 400 of 100 runs. 
Memory set size, K 
Memory set size, K  
Table 1: THE DESIGN OF THE GENETIC ALGORITHM 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Number of agents, N        8 
Number of strategies for each agent, K   6 
Length of binary string, L      8   
Range in decimal values      0-255 
Probability  of  mutation,  pm    0.02 
Probability of crossover, pc      0.30 
Crossover  type    Single  cut 
Reinforcement rule (selection)    Pairwise tournament 
Choice  rule        Pairwise  tournament 
Initialization of strategies      Random from uniform distribution 
Number of runs        100 different random seeds 
_____________________________________________________ 
Note: The GA agents were programmed and the simulations run on a PC using Turbo Pascal. 
 
 
 
Table 2: EXAMPLES OF TWO PATTERNS OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY 
Scenario  Agent  Period  Indexes of variability of individual actions 
    1 2 3 4 
Agent average 
  i x  Overall 
D1 
Overall 
SD1 
Across 
agents 
D2 
Across 
agents 
SD2 
Over 
time 
SD3 
x1  12 12 12 12  12  A 
x2  22 22 22 22  22 
10 5.35 10  7.07  0 
x1  12 22 12 22  17  B 
x2  22 12 22 12  17 
10 5.35 0  0  5.77 
Note: D=difference between maximum and minimum, SD=standard deviation 
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Table 3: SIMULATION RESULTS 
  (1) 
 
Nash 
equilibrium 
 
(2) 
Fresh 
score 
K=6 
p=0.15 
(3) 
Fresh score 
K=6 
p=0.01 
(4) 
Trembling 
hand 
K=6 
p=0.15 
(5) 
Election 
K=6 
p=0.15 
(6) 
Fresh score 
K=2 
p=0.15 
(7) 
Fresh score 
K=90 
p=0.15 
(8) 
Zero 
Intelligence 
agents 
MARKET RESULTS              
Production  128  129.18  129.25 130.54 128.55 135.49 127.92 199.58 
Standard deviation of  production  0  9.89  1.79 14.84 0.11 16.30  4.43 41.23 
Price  3.5  3.41  3.42 3.34 3.47 3.01 3.48  -0.98 
Standard deviation of price  0  0.65  0.13 0.93 0.01 1.03 0.37 2.56 
Profits (% of monopoly profits)  39.5%  34.97%  36.60% 29.59% 38.29% 16.48% 39.27%  -246.95% 
INDIVIDUAL AGENT RESULTS 
(1 obs= production decision for one agent at time t) 
          
MIN1 –  Minimum production across agents  
(average across runs and periods) 
16  9.93  10.40 8.18 12.33 3.68  13.93 5.44 
MAX1 – Maximum production across agents  16  24.99  24.63 26.98 24.24 34.52 17.65 44.53 
D1 –   Difference  0  15.06  14.24 18.80 11.91 30.84  3.72 39.09 
INDEXES OF INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY  
 (1 obs= average production for the same agent over  τ periods)  
      
MIN2 –  Minimum production across agents  
(average across runs) 
16  11.73  10.31 11.85 12.33  8.66 14.51 22.82 
MAX2 –  Maximum production across 
agents  
16  22.81  24.71 22.31 24.24 27.23 16.85 26.99 
D2 –  Difference  0  11.08  14.40 10.47 11.91 18.57  2.35  4.17 
SD2 – Standard deviations of individual 
production 
0  3.68  5.28 3.48 4.43 6.57 0.78 1.41 
INDEX OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY 
OVER TIME  
(1 obs = sd for one agent over  τ periods) 
SD3 –  Standard deviations of individual 
production  0  3.51  0.38 5.46 0.04 8.16 1.31  14.51 
Notes: The statistics are computed on periods 301-400 and are averages over 100 runs with different random seeds 0.005-0.995. (2) Genetic  
Algorithm  v.7.5 (Fresh Score),  N=8, L=8, T=400, τ=100, K=6, pc=0.30, pm=0.02; (3) same as (2) with pm=0.001256; (4) Genetic Algorithm  v.7.6  
(Trembling hand),  N=8, L=8, T=400, τ=100, K=6, pc=0.30, pm=0.02; (5) Genetic Algorithm  v.7.7 (Election),  N=8, L=8, T=400, τ=100, K=6,  
pc=0.30, pm=0.02; (6) same as (2) with K=2;  (7) same as (2) with K=90; (8) Genetic Algorithm  v.7.5.1 (zero intelligence),  N=8, L=8, individual  
actions are drawn with replacement from an uniform distribution on [0,50]. 